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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick* and Brad Eric Scheler**

The Effect of a Cross-Default
Provision on the Ability to
Assume an Executory Contract
or Unexpired Lease

The Bankruptcy Code gives a
trustee or debtor in possession the
power, subject to court approval, to
.
\
assume or reJect executory contracts
1
and unexpired leases. The power to
assume is as important as the power
to reject in that it allows the trustee
or debtor in possession to take full
* Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Hempstead, N.Y.; Of
counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.
**Chairman of the Bankruptcy andRestructuring Department of the firm of Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New
York, N.Y.
The authors thank Brian D. Pfeiffer, an
associate at the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, for his assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). The Bankruptcy
Code does not define "executory contract,"
but most courts define it to mean a contract
under which the obligations of both parties
are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to perform would constitute a material breach. See, e.g., In re Streets & Beard
Farm Partnership, 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.
1989); In re Wegner, 839 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.
1988); Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn. Rev. 439, 460462 (1973). The legislative history to the
Code indicates that Congress intended the
term to mean a contract "on which performance is due to some extent on both sides."
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 347 (1977).

advantage of favorable contracts and
leases. This power is especially important in Chapter 11 reorganization
cases because it allows the debtor to
continue to enforce and reap the benefits of beneficial agreements needed
to rehabilitate its business.
The power to assume, however, is
not without restrictions. An important restriction-designed to protect
the rights of the nondebtor party to
the agreement-is that the trustee or
debtor in possession must, with lim-.
ited exceptions, cure defaults or give
adequate assurance that defaults will
be cured promptly. 2
It is common for parties with multiple agreements to provide that a
default of an obligation under one
agreement, in and of itself, will constitute a default under a different
agreement. Courts have struggled
with the question of whether, as a
condition to assuming an executory
contract or unexpired lease containing such a "cross-default" provision,
the trustee or debtor in possession
must cure-a default of an obligation
arising under a separate contract. If
the bankruptcy court enforces a
cross-default provision, the trustee
or debtor in possession may be prevented from assuming a valuab.le
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See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
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contract or lease solely because of
its inability to cure a default in another agreement.
This issue was recently examined
in In re Kopel, 3 a case in which the
bankruptcy court, based on the particular facts of the case, upheld a
cross-default provision in a commercial lease so that the debtor in possession could not assume the lease
without curing defaults under a
promissory note and consulting
agreement.
The Facts

Pasquale Campanile, a veterinarian, is the sole shareholder of Campanile P.C., which owned a veterinary medicine practice known as
Gateway Veterinary Arts until 1988.
He is also the sole ,Shareholder of
Overbaugh Real Estate Corporation,
a real estate company that owns the
veterinary hospital in which the
Gateway Practice operates.
When Campanile decided to sell
his veterinary practice in 1988, he
sold it to his employee, Ma;Ttin
Kopel, another veterinarian, and provided seller financing for the transaction. The transaction is described
generally in the preliminary statement to an asset acquisition agreement signed on August 23, 1988, by
Pasq~ale Campanile, Campanile
P.C.', Overbaugh, and Martin Kopel:
[Kopel] is emplpyed by [Campanile
P.C.] and desires to purchase the assets of the Gateway Practice. [Kopel]
thereafter desires to continue the prac3

tice and wishes to enter into certain
agreements with Pasquale Campanile
in connection therewith. [Kopel] desires to lease the.building in which the
business operates from Overbaugh.
Overbaugh desires to lease the Gateway Building to [Kopel]-4

In connection with the transaction,
the parties entered into several agreements in addition to the asset acquisition agreement, all signed on the
same day. Martin Kopel issued to
Campanile a promissory note representing $350,000 of the $425,000
purchase price. They also signed a
15-year commercial lease with
Kopel as tenant and Overbaugh as
landlord, and~ consulting agreement
which provided for Campanile to act
as a consultant for Kopel for an annual salary and which also restricted
Campanile's ability to compete with
Kopel. The asset acquisition agreement stated that the execution of
each of these documents was an express condition precedent to the closing of the sale.
A cross-default provision was inserted in each agreement so that if
Kopel defaulted under any one of the
agreements, it would constitute a
default under all agreements and
Campanile would be able to recapture the veterinary practice as a
whole. According to Campanile's
affidavit, he feared that Kopel might
default under the agreements and,
therefore, Kopel's acceptance of the
cross-default provisions was the
principal inducement for Campanile
to go forward with the transaction.

232 B.R. 57 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).

4
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/d. at 61.
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Campanile believed that the only
way to recover full value of the veterinary practice in the event of default would be to quickly step in and
operate the business.5
At the time when Martin Kopel
and his wholly owned subsidiary,
Martin Kopel, P.C., filed Chapter 11
petitions, the monthly rent payments
as required under the lease had been
m~de. But Kopel had not made payments under the promissory note or
the consulting agreement, and had
accumulated substantial arrears.
Kopel, as debtor in possession,
sought a declaration that the crossdefault provision was unenforceable
so that he could assume the lease
without curing defaults under the
note and consulting agreement.
Kopel probably would then attempt
to restructure or modify his obligations under the note and consulting
agreement. Campanile responded by
seeking a declaration that the defaults under the note and consulting
agreement must be cured for the
debtor to assume the lease.

In limited circumstances, ... a court
may exercise equitable discretion to
refuse to enforce a provision where
"there is not substantial economic
detriment to the [non-debtor
counterparty] shown and where enforcement would preclude the bankruptcy estate from realizing the
intrinsic value of its assets."6 -

Courts that have considered
whether a cross-default clause is
enforceable in the context of a motion to assume an executory contract
or unexpired lease have generally
based their decisions upon the notion that federal bankruptcy policy
is offended where a non-debtor party
seeks enforcement of a cross-default
provision to extract priority payments under an unrelated agreement.
The court stated:
[W]here the non-debtor party would
have been willing, absent the existence of the cross-defaulted agreement, to enter into a contract that the
debtor wishes to assume, the crossdefault provision should not be enforced. However, enforcement of a
cross-default provision should not be
refused where to do so would thwart
the non-debtor party's bargain. 7

The Court's Analysis
The bankruptcy court recognized
as axiomatic the principl~ that an executory contract must be rejected or
assumed in its entirety-a debtor
cannot assume parts of a contract
while rejecting the other parts. However, it also noted an exception to the
ali-or-nothing rule that could justify
not enforcing a particular contract
provision notwithstanding assumption of the contract:
s /d. at 62.

[VOL. 32 : 338 2000)

The bankruptcy court examined a
number of cases in which cross-default provisions were either enforced
or denied enforcement. In Bistrian
v. Easthampton Sand & Gravel Co.,
Inc. (In re Easthampton Sand &
6
In re Kopel, 232 B.R. 57, 64 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing In re Village Rathskeller, Inc., 147 B.R. 665, 672 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) which quoted from In re
Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081, 1092
(3d Cir. 1990)).
7
ld. at 66.

340

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

Gravel Co., Inc.), 8 a case involving
facts similar to those in Kopel, the
debtor leased -a facility and purchased a manufacturing business
operating in it by giving the seller a
note representing a substantial percentage of the purchase price. The
bankruptcy court enforced a crossdefault provision in the lease that
made a default on the note a default
under the lease, stating:
[E]quity will not countenance the
debtor's exercise of [section] 365 to
relieve itself of conditions which are
clearly vested by the contracting parties as an essential part of their bargain and which do not contravene
overriding federal policy .... [To do
so] would deny the creditor the benefit of his bargain and would result in
an unjust windfall for the debtor. 9

The court in Easthampton focused
on whether the transaction, taken as
a whole, would have closed absent
the insertion of the cross-default provisions in the interrelated contracts.
The court enforced the cross-default
provision based on a finding that the
provision was part of the bargained
for exchange.
In In re T & H Diner, Inc., 10 the
debtor executed a series of promissory notes representing the purchase
price of a restaurant business operating in the premises leased from the
former owner. The court found that
the lease and series of notes formed
one indivisible agreement constituting a~single contract for purposes of
8

25 B.R. 193 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
/d. at 198-99.
10
108 B.R. 448 (D.N.J. 1989).

9

state law so that the debtor's default
under the notes precluded assumption of the lease. 11
Conversely, in In re Wheeling -Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, 12 the court
refused to enforce a cross-default
provision where a series of separate
insurance policies containing the
provision were not interrelated. "A
loan agreement and accompanying
security agreement are inherently
related in a way that separate policies of insurance and separate leases
are not." 13
Other courts have refused to enforce cross-default provisions on the
groun!ls that the provisions impermissiblY, infringe on the debtor's
right to assume and assign leases, 14
These courts have relied on secti9n
365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, 15
which permits a trustee or debtOF in
11
The court in Kopel expressly avoided
the issue of whether the lease, note, and consulting agreement before it constituted one
contract under state law. It was not necessary to answer that question because the
court held that the cross-default provisions
were enforceable in view of the relationship
between the documents. See In re Kopel, 232
B.R. 57,65 n.4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).
12
54 B.R. 772 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985).
13
/d. at 779, n.9. See also In re Plitt
Amusement Co. of Wash., Inc., 233 B.R.
837, 847 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (stating
"[i]t is well-settled that, in the bankruptcy
context, cross-default provisions do not integrate otherwise separate transactions ....
The cross-default provisions must be disregarded in the bankruptcy law analysis, because they are impermissible restrictions on
assumption and assignment.").
14
See e.g., In re Sambo's Restaurants,
Inc., 24 B.R. 755 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982);
EBG Midtown South Corp. v. McLaren/Hart
Environmental Engineering Corp., 139 B .R.
585,597 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
IS 11 U.S.C. § 365(t),
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possession to assign a contract or
lease notwithstanding a provision in
the agreement that would prohibit,
restrict or condition the assignment,
subject to the exceptions listed in
section 365(c). Cross-default provisions are not an enumerated exception
to section 365(f). 16 Several courts have
reasoned, therefore, that cross-default
provisions are vnenforceable in the
bankruptcy context. 17
The court in Kopel, recognized
that cross-default provisions are "inherently suspect," but did not read
the case law as creating any ~ se
invalidation. Rather:
[A] court should carefully scrutinize
the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular transaction to determine whether enforcement of the
provision would contravene an overriding federal bankruptcy policy and
thus impermissibly hamper the
debtor's reorganization. 18

The Decision
The bankruptcy court in Kopel
based its decision on the relationship
between the agreements. The court
analyzed the cross-default provision
in the lease by examining it's relationship to the promissory note. The
court emphasized that there were

numerous references to the lease in
the other transaction documents.
[T]he documentary evidence leads to
the inescapable conclusion that the
Note and Lease are essential elements
of a single transaction .... The cross
default provision in the Lease must
... be regarded as a necessary term,
the absence of which would have
halted the sale. 19

The court conceded that by enforcing the cross-default provision and
requiring that all defaults under the
note and consulting agreement be
cured as a condition to the assumption of the lease, the debtors' reorganization would be hindered. However, the court could "discern no
federal policy which requires severance of a lease condition solely because it makes a debtor's reorganization more feasible." 20
The court mentioned the fact that
the various agreements involved in
the sale of the veterinary practice
were not all signed by the same legal entities. For example, Pasquale
Campanile was a party to the note
but was not a party to the lease,
which was executed by Overbaugh
as landlord. This fact, however, did
not preclude enforcement of the
cross-default provision:
While enforcement of a cross-default
provision in a lease generally should
not inure to the benefit of a third party,
Overbaugh is not attempting to use
section 365(b) to extract priority payments for unrelated obligations. In-

16

See II U.S.C. § 365(c).
See e.g., In re Sambo's Restaurants,
Inc., 24 B.R. 755 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982);
EBG Midtown South Corp. v. McLaren/Hart
Environmental Engineering Corp., 139 B.R.
585,597 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
18
In re Kopel, 232 B.R. 57, 64 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1999).

[VOL. 32 : 338 2000]

17

19

/d. at 66-67.

20

/d. at 67-68 (citing Easthampton Sand

& Gravel, 25 B.R. at 199).
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stead, the cross-defaults are being asserted to protect the very essence of
the bargain made with Debtors by the
landlord and its principal. Overbaugh
entered into the Lease to facilitate a
larger transaction, not simply to collect rent. 21
With regard to the relationship
between the lease and the consulting agreement, the court found the
connection not as obvious as the
interrelation between the note and the
lease. "Whether to enforce the Lease
provision that renders a Consulting
Agreement breach a default under the
Lease thus turns on whether the parties would have entered into the Lease
absent the Consulting Agreement.' 022
The debtors cited, as evidence of
the independence of the two agreements, the fact that prior to a 1994
amendment to the consulting agreement, the agreement made no reference to the lease. The debtors further
contended that the consulting agreement should be construed as a contract for future employment services
and not an essential part of the transaction. In response to the debtors'
argument the court stated:
A careful review of the Consulting
Agreement in the context of the Gateway Practice purchase transaction ...
leads to the conclusion that the principal purposes of the agreement were
to provide Campanile ... with ongoing cash income from the practice in
addition to payments from the Note
and Lease, to reinforce the legal predi21

/d. at 67.

22

/d.

cate for the non-competition agreement protecting Kopel's interest in the
business, and to provide Campanile
with a continuing connection with the
business during a substantial portion
of the payment period under the Lease
and the Note. Campanile ... depends
on the ongoing income generated by
the Gateway Practice transaction to
support his family. 23
The court concluded that "[t]he Consulting Agreement is but one of several agreements that together
provide for the income stream. " 24 As
the consulting agreement was a fundamental· part of the transaction, the
court held that "enforcement of the
cross-default provision between the
Lease and the Consulting Agreement
would not offend federal bankruptcy
policy.'~ 25

Conclusion
Finding that the lease, note, and
consulting agreement were "entered
into as part of a single, integrated
transaction, " 26 the court held that the
lease could not be assumed without
curing, or providing adequate assurance of promptly curing, defaults
under the note and consulting agreement. Kopel, as debtor in possession,
did not have the option of assuming
the lease while restructuring his obligations under the other documents.
23

/d. at 69.

24

In re Kopel, 232 B.R. 57, 69 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1999).
2S
26

at 68.
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